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Abstract  
Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) does not possess a measure of rational and 
irrational beliefs that meets internationally recognised standards for acceptable psychometric 
properties. Without such a measure the theory/practice of REBT cannot be rigorously 
evaluated, thus undermining its scientific veracity. The current study investigates the validity 
and reliability of a recently developed measure of rational and irrational beliefs: the Attitudes 
and Belief Scale 2-Abbreviated Version (ABS-2-AV). University students from three countries 
completed the ABS-2-AV (N = 397). An alternative models framework using confirmatory 
factor analysis indicated that a theoretically consistent eight-factor model of the ABS-2-AV 
provided the best fit of the data. A number of post-hoc modifications were required in order to 
achieve acceptable model fit results, and these modifications revealed important 
methodological limitations with the ABS-2-AV. Results indicated that the validity of the ABS-
2-AV was undermined due to items measuring both the psychological process of interest 
(rational and irrational beliefs) and the context in which these beliefs processes are presented. 
This is a serious methodological limitation of the ABS-2 and all questionnaires derived from 
it, including the ABS-2-AV. This methodological limitation resulted in the ABS-2-AV 
possessing poor internal reliability. These limitations are discussed in relation to the broader 
REBT literature and the impact such problems have on research and practice. A call is made 
for REBT researchers to come together to develop a “gold standard” method of assessing 
rational and irrational beliefs that meets international standard for psychometric excellence.  
Keywords: attitudes and belief scale; irrational beliefs; rational beliefs; rational emotive 
behaviour therapy (REBT); validity; reliability. 
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Introduction 
 Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) is based on the theoretical proposition 
that cognitive processes (rational and irrational beliefs) mediate the impact of stressful life 
events on the development of cognitive, emotional, behavioural, and psychobiological 
responses (Hyland & Boduszek, 2012). Specifically, irrational beliefs about life events are 
predicted to generate dysfunctional outcomes, while rational beliefs about life events are 
predicted to generate functional outcomes. Rational and irrational beliefs are hypothesised to 
reflect unique psychological processes, rather than merely representing two ends of the same 
psychological process (DiLorenzo, David, & Montgomery, 2011; Dryden & David, 2008). 
REBT theory is distinguishable from alternative cognitive-behavioural models of 
psychopathology on a number of grounds. One unique factor relates to the proposed nature of 
rational and irrational beliefs as key predictors of psychological outcomes (Hyland & 
Boduszek, 2012).  
According to REBT theory, irrational beliefs reflect four distinct cognitive processes: 
(1) Demandingness beliefs – rigid beliefs regarding how things should be, must be, have to be 
etc.; (2) Catastrophizing beliefs – extreme evaluations of the negative outcomes of a given 
event; (3) Frustration Intolerance (FI) beliefs – extreme negative evaluations of the capacity 
one has to withstand adverse life events; and (4) Self-Downing beliefs – extreme evaluations 
of one’s whole self as defective in some regard. Contrastingly, rational beliefs reflect four 
distinctive ways of evaluating the world: (1) Preference beliefs – flexible beliefs about how 
one would like things to be; (2) Realistic Evaluations of Badness (REB) beliefs – non-extreme 
evaluations regarding the consequences of undesirable life events; (3) Frustration Tolerance 
(FT) – realistic evaluations of one’s capacity to withstand adverse life events; and (4) Self-
Acceptance beliefs – beliefs that acknowledge the fallibility of one’s self and the recognition 
that the self is too complex to be globally rated. Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated 
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that irrational beliefs are predictive of a range of psychopathological outcomes including 
depression (Szentagotai, David, Lupu, & Cosman, 2008), posttraumatic stress symptoms 
(Hyland, Shevlin, Adamson, & Boduszek, 2014a), exam-related anxiety (DiLorenzo, David, & 
Montgomery, 2007), and general psychological distress (Cristea, Montgomery, Szamoskozi, 
& David, 2013). Additionally, studies have begun to demonstrate that rational beliefs can act 
as cognitive protective factors against psychopathological responses to adverse life events 
(Hyland, Maguire, Shevlin, & Boduszek, 2014b).  
Given the central role of rational and irrational beliefs in REBT theory, the need for 
well-validated self-report measures of these constructs is critical. Without a valid and reliable 
measure of the fundamental theoretical constructs of the theory, no meaningful test of the 
theory can be conducted. It is disconcerting therefore that existing self-report measures of 
rational and/or irrational beliefs have been heavily criticized for lacking psychometric support 
(Terjesen, Salhany, & Sciutto, 2009). Such criticism generally refers to a lack of consistency 
between established theory and the constructs measured (poor content validity), and use of 
items in existing questionnaires that measure both cognition and emotion. In their assessment 
of existing measures of rational and irrational beliefs, Terjesen et al. concluded that none of 
the available self-report measures possessed acceptable psychometric properties.  
Some researchers have argued that a more recently developed, and frequently cited 
questionnaire, the Attitudes and Beliefs Scale-2 (ABS-2; DiGiusepee, Leaf, Exner, & Robin, 
1988), has overcome some of these psychometric limitations (e.g., Mogoase, Stefan, & David, 
2013). Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case. In a recent study, the psychometric 
properties of the ABS-2 were evaluated using confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) procedures 
(Hyland, Shevlin, Adamson, & Boduszek, 2014c) with results indicating that the ABS-2 
possessed poor factorial validity. Findings indicated that the source of the poor validity was 
related to the scale items being contaminated by contextual factors (items of the ABS-2 were 
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constructed to not only measure the cognitive processes of interest but to also measure various 
contexts in which rational and irrational beliefs could be experienced). The authors also 
reported poor discriminant validity, as correlations between the cognitive processes were all 
very high. Hyland et al. attempted to overcome the methodological limitation of the ABS-2 by 
removing ‘contaminated’ items. Through application of confirmatory bifactor modelling 
procedures the authors were able to identify items from the ABS-2 that were primarily 
measuring the cognitive processes of interest (the rational and irrational beliefs) and were not 
measuring the contextual factors (e.g., comfort, affiliation, and achievement) that were the 
source of miss-fit. The authors thus developed a 24-item abbreviated version of the ABS-2 (the 
ABS-2-AV; Hyland et al., 2014c) which possessed satisfactory factorial validity and internal 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha). This approach was problematic however, as item selection was 
based on a small and unique sample of the population (trauma-exposed law-enforcement 
officers). Ultimately the authors merely fitted the data to the unique profile of the sample 
utilised in that study. There is thus little reason to think that the results of that study would 
generalise to alternative populations. The factorial validity and internal reliability of the ABS-
2-AV is therefore still yet to be established.  
Another recently developed measure of rational and irrational beliefs is the Rational 
and Irrational Beliefs Scale (RAIBS: Mogase et al., 2013). This scale is also undermined by 
the same methodological problem as the ABS-2, as items included in this scale were based on 
the ABS-2 (DiGiuseppe et al., 1988). The authors maintained the use of items that 
simultaneously measure cognitive process (rational or irrational beliefs) and the context in 
which these cognitive processes occur (achievement, approval, comfort, justice, and control). 
As Hyland et al. (2014c) empirically demonstrated, item construction in this manner means 
that it is difficult to determine if one is responding to these items due to the latent psychological 
construct of interest (the rational or irrational belief), or if one’s response is being determined 
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by the latent contextual factor in which the belief is presented. Simply put, the nature of the 
items included in the ABS-2 (DiGiuseppe et al., 1998) means that it, and any measure derived 
from it, are very unlikely to possess satisfactory psychometric properties. 
The current study is conducted in order to test the construct validity and internal 
reliability of the ABS-2-AV (Hyland et al., 2014c) within a distinct sample of participants from 
which the scale was originally developed and tested. A series of alternative, theoretically-
consistent models of the factor structure of the ABS-2-AV will be compared using CFA 
procedures. Composite reliability analysis will be used to better establish the internal reliability 
of the scale as this method has been demonstrated to be superior to traditional measures of 
reliability such as Cronbach’s alpha (Raykov, 1998). Based on previously reported findings 
(Hyland et al., 2014c), we hypothesised that a theoretically derived eight-factor model would 
provide the best fit of the data but that modifications to this model would be required in order 
to achieve satisfactory model fit. Furthermore, given the item contamination (cognition and 
context) we hypothesised that the ABS-2-AV would possess unsatisfactory internal reliability. 
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
The sample for the current study was comprised of undergraduate psychology and 
computer science students recruited from four universities in the Republic of Ireland, Northern 
Ireland, and England (N = 397). The sample included a similar number of men (n = 191, 49.6%) 
and women (n = 194, 50.4) with an average age of 23.33 years (SD = 7.91, range 18-60). 
Students had spent on average 2.23 years in third-level education (SD = 1.20, range 0-7) at the 
time of assessment. The majority of students lived in urban or suburban environments (n = 252, 
65.7%) and were single (n = 315, 82%). All participants were selected in an opportunistic 
fashion and data was collected during the academic calendar from September 2013 to May 
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2014. Ethical permission to conduct the study was obtained from the ethical review board at 
the institution to which the corresponding author belongs. All students under the age 18 were 
excluded from the study. Participants were assured of confidentiality, instructed that they were 
under no obligation to participate, and could withdraw at any time. Participants completed the 
questionnaires using a paper-and-pencil format in their regular lecture theatre and laboratory 
settings. No inducements or incentives (e.g., course credit) were used to recruit volunteers. 
Measures 
 The Attitudes and Belief Scale 2-Abbreviated Version (ABS-2-AV: Hyland et al., 
2014c) is a 24-item self-report measure of rational and irrational beliefs consistent with 
contemporary REBT theory. The scale is intended to measure the four irrational belief 
processes (Demandingness, Catastrophizing, FI, and Self-Downing) and the four rational belief 
processes (Preferences, REB, FT, and Self-Acceptance). Each item is scored along a five-point 
Likert scale from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”), with higher scores in each 
case indicating greater endorsement of a given belief process. 
Analytical Plan 
Five models of the latent structure of the ABS-2-AV were specified and tested using 
CFA procedures in Mplus version 7.11 (Muthen & Muthen, 198-2013). Robust maximum 
likelihood estimation was selected as this method has been demonstrated to be robust to non-
normally distributed data, and to be superior to alternative methods of handling missing data 
such as listwise deletion (Yuan & Bentler, 2000). Model 1 is a one-factor model in which 
responses to all 24 items are explained in terms of a single latent variable. Model 2 is a two-
factor model in which the 12 irrationally-phrased items are explained by one factor 
(‘Irrationality’), and the 12 rationally-phrased items are explained by another latent factor 
(‘Rationality’). Model 3 is a four-factor model in which the rational and irrational belief 
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processes are considered as two ends of a single continuum. In other words, the items 
purporting to measure the irrational (e.g., Demandingness) and rational (e.g., Preferences) 
processes load onto one factor. Model 4 is an eight-factor model in which three items load onto 
each of the rational and irrational belief processes. This model is consistent with the theory of 
REBT (David & Szentagotai, 2006). Model 5 is a higher-order variant of Model 4 in which the 
covariation between the four irrational beliefs is explained by a higher-order ‘Irrationality’ 
latent variable, and the covariation between the four rational beliefs is explained by a higher-
order ‘Rationality’ latent variable. 
 Kline’s (2011) recommendations for determining model fit were followed for the CFA 
analyses. Good model fit is indicated by a chi-square-to-degrees of freedom (χ2:df) ratio of less 
than 3:1. Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker & 
Lewis, 1973) values greater than .90 suggest adequate model fit, while values greater than .95 
suggest excellent model fit. Values for the root-mean-square error of approximation with 90% 
confidence intervals (RMSEA 90% CI: Steiger, 1990) and the standardized root-mean-square 
residual (SRMR: Joreskog & Sorborn, 1981) of .08 or less are indicative of adequate model fit, 
while values of .05 or less indicate excellent model fit. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; 
Akaike, 1987) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) were used to evaluate 
alternative nested models, with the smaller value in each case indicating the best fitting model. 
The CFI, RMSEA, BIC, and AIC all have explicit penalties for model complexity. 
Results 
Model Fit Results 
The model fit results are reported in full in Table 1 and, as can be seen, Models 1, 2, 3, 
and 5 were all found to be poor approximations of the data and were thus rejected. Consistent 
with our prediction, the eight-factor model of the ABS-2-AV was found to provide the best 
9 
 
representation of the data. Despite providing the best fit of the data, the overall model fit 
statistics were somewhat unsatisfactory. The χ2:df ratio, RMSEA, and SRMR results suggested 
adequate model fit, while the CFI and TLI values were below the criteria for acceptable fit. We 
thus inspected the modification indices provided by Mplus to determine the source of the model 
misspecification. Following the methodological procedures set forth by Byrne (2011), the 
eight-factor model was adapted in an exploratory manner through the introduction of a model 
parameter that would result in the largest improvement in overall fit. This process is conducted 
in a sequential fashion (only one modification is made at a time) until such time as satisfactory 
model fit is obtained. Importantly, any modifications made to the model had to be 
understandable from a theoretical perspective, and were not introduced simply on statistical 
grounds (improvement in model fit).   
 Based on the modification indices, item 3, which was intended to measure FI (“It's 
unbearable to fail at important things, and I can't stand not succeeding at them”) was shown 
to also be an indicator of the Demandingness factor. A cross-factor loading was introduced and 
this led to an improvement in fit (χ2 = 417, df = 223; CFI = .911; TLI = .889; RMSEA 90% CI 
= .047 (.040-.054); SRMR = .050). The TLI value still failed to satisfy acceptable standards 
and thus modification indices were again inspected. This revealed a high residual covariance 
between item 6 (“I do not like to be uncomfortable, tense or nervous, but I can tolerate being 
tense”) and item 7 (“When life is hard and I feel uncomfortable, I realize it is not awful to feel 
uncomfortable or tense, only unfortunate and I can keep going”). While item 6 purports to 
measure FT beliefs and item 7 purports to measure REB beliefs, it was judged appropriate to 
include a residual covariance between these two items in the model given the similarity in 
phrasing (reference to withstanding uncomfortable situations). Following the inclusion of this 
residual covariance, the model fit the data satisfactorily (see Table 1) and therefore no further 
modifications were deemed appropriate (see Figure 1 for final model).  
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 The standardized factor loadings for the final, modified eight-factor model of the ABS-
2-AV are presented in Table 2. All items loaded positively, and statistically significantly onto 
their respective latent factor. In the majority of cases these factor loadings were of a robust 
magnitude, however, a small number of items possessed weak factor loadings. While item 3 
loaded strongly onto the Demandingness factor, it was a weak indicator of FI. Items 4 (REB) 
and 6 (FT) yielded factor loadings less than .30, suggesting that these items are poor indicators 
of their respective latent factors. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 Table 3 reports the correlations between the eight factors. The four irrational belief 
factors were all moderately and positively associated with one another. This indicates a 
reasonable degree of discrimination between the factors. The four rational belief factors were 
also positively associated with one another. However, in this case the associations were 
stronger and thus indicative of poor discrimination between the rational belief factors. In 
particular, the FT and REB factors were very strongly associated (r = .86). The correlations 
between the rational and irrational counterparts of Demandingness and Preferences (r = -.46), 
Catastrophizing and REB (r = -.54), and FI and FT (r = -.49) were all negative and of a moderate 
magnitude. This suggests that these rational and irrational beliefs are predominately distinct 
psychological processes. Contrastingly, Self-Acceptance and Self-Downing beliefs (r = -.76) 
were strongly (negatively) associated with one another, suggesting that these rational-irrational 
beliefs may be more reflective of the same underlying psychological process that then other 
belief processes. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Composite Reliability Analysis 
The use of traditional measures of internal reliability such as Cronbach’s alpha have 
been criticised within a latent variable modelling context given the propensity to over- or 
under-estimate scale reliability (Raykov, 1998). In order to provide a more rigorous assessment 
of the internal reliability of the ABS-2-AV, the current study estimated the composite reliability 
of the measurement properties of the scale. Values greater than .60 are considered acceptable 
(Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001). The reliability of Demandingness 
(including item 3; .75), Catastrophizing (.66); Self-Downing (.76), Preferences (.76), and Self-
Acceptance (.78) were all acceptable. The composite reliability for FI (.58) and FT (.53) were 
slightly below satisfactory levels, while the REB scale (.32) possessed poor reliability.  
Discussion 
The field of REBT has been criticised for a lack of scientific rigor in the testing of its 
theoretical hypotheses and treatment efficacy (Padesky & Beck, 2003). A fundamental 
perquisite for such research to be undertaken is the availability of a reliable and valid method 
of measuring the central theoretical constructs (rational and irrational beliefs). The field of 
REBT has suffered greatly from the lack of a “gold standard” measure of rational and irrational 
beliefs that possesses excellent psychometric properties, is congruent with contemporary 
theory, and is consistently used among various researchers in the field so that results can be 
easily compared and collated (Terjesen et al., 2009).  
Results of the current study were both encouraging and discouraging for the developing 
science of REBT. On a positive note, the theoretically consistent eight-factor model of the 
ABS-2-AV was found to provide superior fit to the alternative models tested. Together with 
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previous factor analytic data (Hyland et al., 2014c) there appears to be consistent support for 
the basic structure of rational and irrational beliefs. However, this positive finding must be 
viewed in light of the fact that the actual fit of the model to the obtained data unsatisfactory. In 
an absolute sense, the REBT model of rational and irrational beliefs failed to adequately explain 
the nature of responses to the 24 items of the ABS-2-AV. This finding suggests that while the 
underlying theory may be accurate, the method of assessing this theory is problematic. 
The source of the measurement problem is related to the inability of certain items to 
accurately measure the psychological construct that they are intended to measure. One item 
specified to measure FI beliefs was found to be a measure of Demandingness beliefs, while 
two items, one intended to measure REB beliefs and the other intended to measure FT beliefs, 
were found to possess a high degree of similarity. The similarity in responses to these two items 
was due to some unmeasured latent variable. Inspection of the content of these two items 
revealed that both items related to the belief in one’s ability to manage uncomfortable 
situations. This result is indicative of the major methodological limitation associated with the 
general ABS-2 questionnaire, namely that the indicators included in these scales contain 
measures of both cognitive processes (rational and irrational beliefs) and context (the context 
in which the belief may manifest); and this finding is consistent with the results of Hyland et 
al. (2014c). The simultaneous measurement of the belief processes and the context in which 
they may occur will negatively affect the measurement properties of any scales that includes 
such items.  
Further problems with the ABS-2-AV were evident through the inspection of the factor 
loadings, factor correlations, and composite reliability results. Overall, the findings revealed 
that the ABS-2-AV provided a reasonably acceptable (although far from ideal) measure of the 
irrational belief processes, and a poor measure of the rational belief processes. With the 
exception of the cross-factor loading problem with item 3 (measuring Demandingness rather 
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than Catastrophizing), all items were found to be reasonably good measures of their intended 
irrational belief process. Internal reliability, determined via the use of composite reliability 
analysis, also signified a good degree of consistency among the items of each factor. The 
correlations between the four irrational belief processes ranged from weak (r = .29 between 
Demandingness and Self-Downing) to strong (r = .66 between LFT and Catastrophizing), 
suggesting reasonable levels of discrimination between the factors. Issues of multicollinearity 
in predictive modelling studies should therefore not be of major concern. 
A different picture was evident in relation to the measurement of the rational belief 
processes. Many of the items used to measure REB and FT beliefs possessed very low factor 
loadings, indicating that these items are poor measures of their intended rational belief 
processes. Consequently the items used to measures these factors possessed poor internal 
reliability, particularly in the case of the REB factor. In addition, the correlations between the 
four rational belief processes were generally strong (with the sole exception of the relationship 
between Preferences and Self-Acceptance), indicating poor discrimination between the factors. 
The lack of satisfactory internal reliability and discrimination between the factors means that 
predictive modelling using the rational belief scores becomes highly problematic. This is 
particularly undesirable given the extremely limited data that currently exists regarding the role 
of rational beliefs in mitigating psychopathological responses and in promoting 
psychologically healthy outcomes (DiLorenzo et al., 2011; Hyland et al., 2014b). 
Current results were interesting to consider in light of the REBT theoretical proposition 
that rational and irrational beliefs are not bipolar psychological constructs, but rather reflect 
two separate continua (DiLorenzo et al., 2011; Dryden & David, 2008). The results were 
generally supportive of this proposition, as the correlations between Demandingness and 
Preferences, Catastrophizing and REB, and FI and FT were all of a moderate nature, suggesting 
that high scores on one belief process are not necessarily reflective of low scores on the other. 
14 
 
Current results are therefore consistent with previous findings regarding the relationship 
between these rational and irrational beliefs (e.g., DiLorenzo et al., 2011; Fulop, 2007; 
Macavei, 2002). The exception to this pattern was the observed relationship between Self-
Downing and Self-Acceptance beliefs. The strength of the association between these beliefs 
indicates that those with high levels of Self-Downing beliefs are likely to possess low levels of 
Self-Acceptance beliefs, and vice-versa. This finding is consistent with those reported by 
Hyland et al. (2014c) and suggest that Self-Downing and Self-Acceptance beliefs likely reflects 
separate ends of the same underlying psychological process.   
 These findings have significant implications for both researchers and clinicians. The 
field of REBT research and practice faces a serious problem given the apparent absence of a 
method of assessing the central theoretical constructs in a psychometrically sound manner. 
Without such a measure researchers are limited in their ability to rigorously test theoretical 
predictions, develop and advance current theory, compare the predictions of REBT theory to 
alternative and competing models of psychopathology, and to assess the proposed mechanism 
of recovery in therapeutic interventions. It is essential therefore that researchers in the field of 
REBT come together to develop a measure of rational and irrational beliefs that satisfies 
internationally recognised standards for validity and reliability (see Terwee et al., 2007). The 
most widely recognised criteria for establishing the psychometric properties of a given scale 
are provided by the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) of the Medical Outcomes Trust 
(SAC, 2002). Eight criteria are presented which include: (1) conceptual and measurement 
models, (2) validity, (3) reliability, (4) responsiveness, (5) interpretability, (6) respondent and 
administrative burden, (7) alternative forms, and (8) cultural and language adaptations 
(translations). The development of new measures of rational and irrational beliefs should be 
sensitive to each of these criteria.  
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It is recommended that the development of new, psychometrically sound measures of 
rational and irrational beliefs follow many of the same recommendations previously provided 
by Terjesen et al. (2009). We additionally propose that the foundation of a new “gold standard” 
method of measuring rational and irrational beliefs should start from the recognition of an eight 
factor structure (measurement of the four irrational beliefs and the four rational beliefs). Item 
construction must be conducted in a manner that ensures that only the cognitive process (i.e., 
each belief type) is measured. Every effort should be made to avoid contaminating the items 
of the scale with statements that (implicitly or explicitly) measure affect, behaviour, or context. 
One exception to this recommendation could relate to the development of situationally-specific 
measures of rational and irrational beliefs. From a standard generalized measure of rational and 
irrational beliefs, situationally-specific measures could be derived as per the nature of the study 
being undertaken (e.g., a study of exam-related anxiety). In such cases, the context is explicitly 
identifiable within each item and relates directly to the nature of the psychological process 
under investigation in a given study. Furthermore, these items should be short, easy-to-
understand statements that avoid confusion and response acquiescence. This will facilitate the 
development of translated versions of the scale that are valid across multiple cultures and 
contexts. Future scale developers should also be cognizant of the number of items used to 
measure each belief process. Single indicator items should be avoided, as they preclude 
assessments of reliability and factor discrimination. Nevertheless, scale developers should also 
avoid numerous indicators as such measures can become overly lengthy and impractical for 
research and clinical work. We recommend 3-5 items to measure each of the eight factors. 
Additionally, each item should ideally be measured along a continuous scale of 
agreement/disagreement (e.g., a 1-10 scale) rather than measured with a traditional ordered-
categorical Likert scales.  
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The current study is limited due to the use of a relatively small and distinctive sample 
of the population. Important claims regarding the psychometric properties of a given scale 
would preferably be made based on a more representative sample of the population. It is 
possible that the current results are influenced by cultural or demographic factors related to the 
current cohort. However, given that current findings are consistent with previous discoveries 
(Hyland et al., 2014c; Terjesen et al., 2009) it is unlikely that these results are due to sampling 
biases. A further notable limitation with the ABS-2-AV, and all other scales derived from the 
ABS-2, is the sole focus on self-downing and self-acceptance beliefs, while REBT theory is 
explicit in stating that these global evaluative beliefs (rational and irrational) can be 
additionally directed towards others and the world/environment. Methods of measuring these 
psychological processes must also be considered in future scale developments.  
 In conclusion, the current study provides additional evidence to the existing REBT 
literature that current measures of rational and irrational beliefs are unsatisfactory. Moreover, 
the current study indicates that attempts to develop psychometrically sound scales from 
existing and widely used measures (e.g., ABS-2) are flawed given the inherent methodological 
limitations associated with these scales. In order to substantially advance the science and 
practice of REBT we call on researchers throughout the field to come together to develop a 
new measure of rational and irrational beliefs. Such a measure should be constructed and 
assessed with recognition of the necessary criteria for the establishment of psychometric 
excellence (SAC, 2002; Terwee et al., 2007). The joint efforts of researchers from multiple 
nations working in unison to develop a “gold standard” measure of rational and irrational 
beliefs would signify a major advancement in the field of REBT research and practice. 
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Table 1. Fit Indices for the Alternative Factor Models of the ABS-2_AV 
Model χ2 df CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI) SRMR AIC BIC 
Model 1 1260* 252 .538 .494 .100 (.095-.106) .098 26863 27150 
Model 2 1140* 251 .592 .552 .094 (.089-.100) .091 26709 27000 
Model 3 855* 246 .721 .687 .079 (.073-.085) .076 26393 26703 
Model 4 518* 224 .865 .833 .058 (.051-.064) .056 26039 26437 
Model 5 681* 243 .799 .772 .067 (.061-.073) .079 26194 26517 
Modified Model 4  397* 222 .919 .900 .045 (.038-.052) .048 25917 26323 
Note.  N = 397; χ2 = chi-square goodness of fit statistic; df = degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker Lewis Index; RMSEA 
(90% CI) = Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation with 90% Confidence Intervals; SRMR = Standardized Square Root Mean Residual; AIC 
= Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; * Indicates χ2 are statistically significant (p < .001). 
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Table 2. Standardized Factor Loadings (and Standard Errors) for the modified eight-Factor model of the ABS2_AV 
Item β SE 
Demandingness   
5. I must do well at important things, and I will not accept it if I do not do well. .71 .05 
12. It's essential to do well at important jobs; so I must do well at these things. .61 .05 
22. I must be successful at things that I believe are important, and I will not accept anything less than success. .64 .05 
3. It's unbearable to fail at important things, and I can't stand not succeeding at them. .65 .06 
Catastrophizing 
11. It's awful to be disliked by people who are important to me, and it is a catastrophe if they don't like me. 
 
.58 
 
.06 
13. Sometimes I think the hassles and frustrations of everyday life are awful and the worst part of my life. .69 .04 
23. If loved ones or friends reject me, it is not only bad, but the worst possible thing that could happen to me. .61 .05 
Frustration Intolerance 
1. Its unbearable being uncomfortable, tense or nervous and I can't stand it when I am. 
 
.59 
 
.06 
3. It's unbearable to fail at important things, and I can't stand not succeeding at them. .16 .06 
8. I can't stand being tense or nervous and I think tension is unbearable. .82 .05 
Self-Downing 
2. If important people dislike me, it is because I am an unlikable bad person. 
 
.61 
 
.05 
9. If I do not perform well at tasks that are very important to me, it is because I am a worthless bad person. .74 .05 
19. When people I like reject me or dislike me, it is because I am a bad or worthless person. .79 .04 
Preferences 
10. I do not want to fail at important tasks but I realize that I do not have to perform well just because I want to. 
 
.62 
 
.05 
14. I want to perform well at some things, but I do not have to do well just because I want to. .68 .05 
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17. I want to do well at important tasks, but I realize that I don't have to do well at these important tasks just because 
I want to. 
.77 .04 
Realistic Evaluation of Badness  
4. It is unfortunate when I am frustrated by hassles in my life, but I realize it's only disappointing and not awful to 
experience hassles. 
 
.22* 
 
.10 
7. When life is hard and I feel uncomfortable, I realize it is not awful to feel uncomfortable or tense, only unfortunate 
and I can keep going. 
.46 .08 
15. It's bad to be disliked by certain people, but I realize it is only unfortunate to be disliked by them. .42 .07 
Frustration Tolerance 
6. I do not like to be uncomfortable, tense or nervous, but I can tolerate being tense. 
 
.29 
 
.07 
16. I get distressed if I'm not doing well at important tasks, but I can stand the distress of failing at important tasks. .54 .06 
18. It's only frustrating not doing well at some tasks, but I know I can stand the frustration of performing less than 
well. 
.42 .07 
Self-Acceptance 
20. When people whom I want to like me disapprove of me, I know I am still a worthwhile person. 
 
.61 
 
.05 
21.  Even when my life is tough and difficult, I realize that I am a person who is just as good as anyone else even 
though I have hassles. 
.85 .03 
24. When my life becomes uncomfortable, I realize that I am still a good person even though I am uncomfortable. .74 .04 
Note. All Factor loadings are statistically significant (p < .001), except * (p = .02). 
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Table 3. Correlations (standard errors) between the eight factors of the ABS-2-AV 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Demandingness ---        
2. Catastrophizing .48 (.07) --       
3. Frustration Intolerance  .40 (.07) .66 (.07) --      
4. Self-Downing .29 (.06) .61 (.06) .33 (.07) --     
5. Preferences  -.46 (.07) -.30 (.08) -.22 (.07)* -.30 (.07) --    
6. Realistic Evaluation of Badness  -.27 (.11)** -.54 (.11) -.55 (.11) -.66 (.12) .69 (.14) --   
7. Frustration Tolerance  -.52 (.08) -.50 (.08) -.49 (.09) -.41 (.08) .77 (.06) .86 (.12) --  
8. Self-Acceptance -.15 (.07)** -.50 (.07) -.24 (.07)* -.76 (.04) .29 (.07) .72 (.11) .56 (.07) -- 
Note. All factor correlations are statistically significant (p < .001), except * (p < .01), and ** (p < .05). 
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Figure 1. Final model of the ABS-2-AV. Note. DEM = Demandingness, CAT = Catastrophizing, FI = Frustration Intolerance, SD = Self-
Downing, PRE = Preferences, REB = Realistic Evaluations of Badness, FT = Frustration Intolerance, SA = Self-Acceptance. 
 
